Tuấn Cao-Đắc (Danlambao)
- Abstract: In the second part of his two-part article, author Cù Huy
Hà Vũ argues that the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) must be
dissolved to save the country. While this conclusion may have some
merit, several of his arguments and conclusions in the first part are
completely wrong. In essence, his assertions about the Vietnam War,
including those that state there was no invasion and the Republic of
Vietnam (RVN) was not a state or country, are incorrect. More
importantly, his arguments that there was no loss of country and April
30 should not be the national day of hatred indicate his ignorance about
the anti-communist Overseas Vietnamese (OV) and the anti-communist
Vietnamese, especially the South Vietnamese, people living in Vietnam.
In reality, their sense of loss of country has always been genuine
because indeed the RVN was occupied by the Vietnamese communist faction.
The national day of hatred is commemorated not just to mourn the loss
of freedom and democracy, but also to mark the beginning of the darkest
period in the history of Vietnam.
***
Cù Huy Hà Vũ (2015), a Vietnamese political dissident and a scholar
at George Washington University, recently wrote an article published on
the Web page of Voice of America (VOA), Vietnamese Department. In
essence, his article may be divided into two parts. In the first part,
he argues that April 30 should not be the national day of hatred within
the Overseas Vietnamese (OV) communities. In the second part, he argues
that while there should not be a national day of hatred, the communist
government of Vietnam is the culprit for creating hatred because of its
behavior. Accordingly, the dissolution of the Vietnamese Communist Party
(VCP) is the only way to save the country of Vietnam and to erase all
the hatred among the Vietnamese people.
While the conclusion of his essay may have some merit, there are several problems in its first part.
A. Cù’s article is incoherent because its two parts have no logical connection
One can quickly recognize an anomaly in Cù’s essay: there is no logical
connection between the first and the second parts. Each part can stand
logically on its own, but each part does not need to provide the premise
to, or use the conclusion of, the other part. Cù attempts to link the
two parts by a semantic link; i.e., the word "hatred." However, the word
"hatred" does not logically link the two parts together.
An expository essay having distinct parts that seem unrelated is called
one that lacks coherence, or is fragmented or disjointed. There is
nothing really serious about an incoherent expository essay. The worst
one can say is that the author of the essay is a bad writer. However,
when a political essay contains a chain of arguments in which the
conclusion of one argument is the premise of the next argument,
culminating in a final conclusion, there is a danger in lack of
coherence. The danger is that careless readers may be so enthusiastic
about the final conclusion of the essay that they may assume everything
in the essay is correct. When an essay has two parts like Cù’s essay,
the wrong or incorrect conclusion(s) in the first part may be shadowed
or obscured, or even interpreted as correct by the apparent correct
conclusion in the second part.
The conclusion that the dissolution of the VCP is the only way to save
the country of Vietnam and to erase all the hatred among the Vietnamese
people is so attractive or tantalizing to many Vietnamese that they may
assume, sometimes subconsciously, that the arguments and conclusion(s)
in the first part are correct, especially the conclusion that there
should not be the national day of hatred within the OV communities.
Accordingly, it is important to point out the erroneous arguments and
conclusions in Cù’s first part to clear up any misunderstanding or
confusion and to "set the record straight." In this article, I will not
discuss the second part of Cù’s essay; I will focus only on the first
part.
B. Cù’s first part is full of errors and inaccuracies, leading to incorrect conclusions
In the first part, Cù bases his arguments on two premises: (1) an act
of invasion can only be performed by a state/ country to another
state/country, (2) the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) (Việt Nam Cộng Hòa) in
the South and the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) (Việt
Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa) in the North were merely two territorial portions
of the state of Vietnam and were not states or countries, based on the
RVN’s official point of view. Premise (2) is the conclusion of an
argument having two premises: (3) No statement in two Constitutions of
the RVN asserts that the "state or country" only includes South Vietnam,
and (4) South Vietnam had unification plans.
Based on (1) and (2), Cù concludes that there was no invasion by the
North into the South because an act of invading could only be performed
by a state or country to another state or country and neither the North
nor the South was a state or country. Cù then states that since there
was no invasion and there was no state or country, there was no loss of
country. From this, Cù concludes that April 30 should not be called
"The National Day of Hatred" ("Ngày Quốc hận"). ("Cũng như vậy, không
thể gọi ngày 30 tháng 4 là 'Ngày Quốc hận' vì đã không có chuyện 'mất
nước' vào ngày đó.") Cù supports this conclusion with an argument that
after April 30, 1975, the state or country of the unified Vietnam has
remained in existence on the world map, being a member of the United
Nations, and having diplomatic ties with many other countries, including
the United States.
Cù’s arguments are flawed in at least four aspects: definition of
invasion, statehood of South Vietnam or the RVN, the loss of country,
and meaning of the national day of hatred. Any one of Cù’s arguments or
conclusions can invalidate his entire chain of arguments. However, I am
not merely interested in showing a particular argument or conclusion is
wrong. I want to show Cù’s entire concept regarding state or country,
the loss of country, and the national day of hatred are wrong.
1. Invasion is a military operation involving geopolitical entities, not necessarily only sovereign states or countries.
Cù’s premise that an act of invasion can only be performed by a state
or country to another state or country is an incorrect premise.
By definition, an invasion "is a military offensive in which large parts
of combatants of one geopolitical entity aggressively enter territory
controlled by another such entity, generally with the objective of
either conquering, liberating or re-establishing control or authority
over a territory, forcing the partition of a country, altering the
established government or gaining concessions from said government, or a
combination thereof" (Wikipedia 2015a).
Invasion, therefore, does not necessarily involve one or more
states/countries. Any large-scale military operation by an entity with
the intention to occupy a territory presently occupied by another entity
is called an "invasion." The military operations conducted by the North
Vietnamese against South Vietnam during the Vietnam War and culminating
in the occupation of South Vietnam constitute an invasion, whether or
not North Vietnam or South Vietnam is a sovereign state or country.
Even if North Vietnam and South Vietnam are factions in a civil war, a
thesis Cù wants to advance, the North Vietnamese military operations
are termed "invasions" because their "armed forces enter[ed] into a
well-defined part of [South Vietnam] that, at the time of the operation,
was completely under the control of armed forces of [South Vietnam]"
(Wikipedia 2015a). Examples of such invasions are military operations
conducted during the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil
War (ibid.).
In reality, as shown in all historical documents, Hồ Chí Minh and his
comrades, including Lê Duẩn and Võ Nguyên Giáp, implemented a
systematic plan of invading South Vietnam throughout the years during
the war. In all these years and after the war, world historians and the
South Vietnamese, civilian or military, called all of Northern communist
military campaigns or offensives as acts of invasion. See, for example,
"South Vietnamese officials claim that two companies from the North
Vietnamese army have invaded South Vietnam" (History), "This
conventional invasion... was a radical departure from previous North
Vietnamese offensives" (Wikipedia 2015f), "The beginning of the end came
in early March 1975 when an invasion force numbering twenty divisions
launched what turned out to be the final offensive of the war" (Sorley
1999, 376).
Cù’s incorrect definition of “invasion” is not really important because
regardless of whether an invasion involves a state or a geopolitical
entity, South Vietnam was a full-fledged sovereign state prior to April
30, 1975 as discussed in the following.
2. During the war, South Vietnam was a sovereign state or a country:
It is very difficult to have clear definitions of countries, sovereign
states, and nations in general. I will discuss this problem in a next
article. However, it is fairly easy to prove that South Vietnam, or the
Republic of Vietnam, was a sovereign state or a country prior to April
30, 1975.
At first, Cù argues that the phrase "Republic of Vietnam" merely refers
to the name of the political regime and not to the name of the state or
country of South Vietnam, as provided in the RVN’s constitution. While
this is not important in the analysis, I maintain that "South Vietnam"
and "the Republic of Vietnam" essentially refer to the same sovereign
state or country because, prior to April 30, 1975, the regime of the RVN
had stayed the same in South Vietnam and therefore the two are
synonymous.
In his main argument, Cù emphasizes that there is no statement in both
[1956 and 1967] Constitutions of the RVN that asserts that the "state or
country" only includes South Vietnam ("...không có câu nào của cả hai
Hiến pháp trên quy định 'quốc gia' chỉ gồm miền Nam Việt Nam.")
By using only the RVN’s constitutions and other plans (e.g., unification
efforts), Cù asserts that "according to the official viewpoints of the
RVN, there was only one state/ country in Vietnam; the North and the
South were merely two territorial parts of the state/ country of
Vietnam" ("theo quan điểm chính thống của Việt Nam Cộng hòa thì ở Việt
Nam chỉ có một quốc gia, miền Nam và miền Bắc chỉ là hai phần lãnh thổ
của quốc gia Viêt Nam.") On this basis, Cù concludes that there was no
invasion because neither North nor South Vietnam was a state or country;
therefore, there was no loss of country and April 30 cannot be a
national day of hatred.
Cù’s arguments claiming that the RVN was not a state or country are
invalid or wrong on at least three grounds: (1) self contradiction, (2)
logical fallacy, and (3) objective standard of statehood. Any one of
these grounds is sufficient to invalidate his arguments.
a. Cù contradicts himself when he calls South Korea a state or
country, even though South Korea and South Vietnam had the same
constitutional basis that he uses to decline South Vietnam’s statehood.
In proving that South Vietnam was not a state or country, Cù takes a
subjective approach, i.e., he uses the viewpoint adopted by South
Vietnam. (We will see that his interpretation of South Vietnam’s
viewpoint is incorrect.) Based on the two constitutions of South Vietnam
and South Vietnam’s plans for unification as evidenced by statements
printed on stamps and made by South Vietnam leaders, Cù concludes that
South Vietnam never perceived itself as a sovereign state or country and
only considered the entire Vietnam as a sovereign state. Therefore,
North Vietnam and South Vietnam were merely two territorial parts of the
country.
Using exactly the same criteria set forth by Cù, one can easily
conclude that South Korea is not currently a state and was not a state
or country during the war with North Korea in 1950-1953.
The Constitution of South Korea was first drafted in 1948 and has been
revised numerous times. Article 3 of the Constitution declares, "The
territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula
and its adjacent islands" (Constitute 2015). Article 4 further
declares, "The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall
formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the
principles of freedom and democracy" (ibid.) In other words, the
Constitution of South Korea uses even stronger and more explicit
language than the RVN’s two constitutions by unambiguously defining its
territory as the entire Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands, not
just the southern part. In addition, the Constitution of South Korea
explicitly declares the unification effort. South Korea’s unification
effort, therefore, is clearly stated in the Constitution, not just
implied by statements printed on stamps or declared by its leaders.
Therefore, based on Cù’s criteria, South Korea would not be a state or country.
However, in his essay, Cù asserts that North Korea and South Korea were
two states or countries during the war from 1950 to 1953. He writes,
"In other words, the war between North and South Vietnam in the period
from 1955 to April 30, 1975 was a civil war and therefore was not a war
between two states, between two 'countries,' as what happened between
the North and the South of the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953."
("Nói cách khác, chiến tranh Nam - Bắc Việt Nam giai đoạn từ 1955 đến
30/4/1975 là một cuộc nội chiến và vì vậy không phải là chiến tranh giữa
hai quốc gia, giữa hai 'nước', tương tự như những gì đã diễn ra giữa
miền Nam và miền Bắc bán đảo Triều Tiên từ 1950 đến 1953.")
By asserting that South Korea was a state or country while South Vietnam
did not have the same status even though both "territories" have the
same constitutional basis according to his own definition criteria, Cù
contradicts himself. In other words, Cù refutes his own argument.
b. Cù’s argument based on the RVN’s two constitutions and plans for unification contains a logical fallacy:
Cù’s argument based on the RVN’s two constitutions is incorrect and
amounts to a logical fallacy. There are actually several logical
fallacies in Cù’s argument, including formal fallacies and informal
fallacies, such as argument from ignorance, false analogy, extended
analogy, different standards, and non-sequitur. Due to limited space, I
will only focus on non-sequitur and briefly discuss the others.
The logical fallacy of "non-sequitur" is usually described as "that does
not follow." In other words, what is offered as evidence or reason is
irrelevant or adds very little to support the conclusion (Bo Bennett).
Example: Today is rainy; therefore, the two lines are parallel.
On the basis that there is no statement in both [1956 and 1967]
Constitutions of the RVN stating that "state/country" only includes
South Vietnam ("... không có câu nào của cả hai Hiến pháp trên quy định
'quốc gia' chỉ gồm miền Nam Việt Nam") and the RVN’s unification
efforts, Cù asserts that "according to the official viewpoints of the
RVN, there was only one state in Vietnam; the North and the South were
merely two territorial parts of the state of Vietnam" ("theo quan điểm
chính thống của Việt Nam Cộng hòa thì ở Việt Nam chỉ có một quốc gia,
miền Nam và miền Bắc chỉ là hai phần lãnh thổ của quốc gia Viêt Nam.")
Let’s designate A = "the RVN Constitutions," B= "the RVN official
viewpoint," X = "only South Vietnam is designated a sovereign state," Y =
"the entire Vietnam is designated a sovereign state," and Z = "the
RVN’s unification plan."
What Cù argues is: Because: (a) A does not show X, and (b) Z exists, B is Y.
We can see immediately that there is no connection between what is offered as evidence and the conclusion.
There is no connection between A and B. What the constitution describes
is not necessarily the official viewpoint of the people about the
statehood of their country (or, according to Cù, their community or
region). By definition, "a constitution is a set of fundamental
principles or established precedents according to which a state or other
organization is governed" (Wikipedia 2015b). A constitution defines the
supreme laws and/or the structure of the state or the organization. It
does not mean a constitution cannot define the status or the nature of
the state or the organization, but without such definition, one cannot
draw conclusions about the status or nature of the organization.
There is also no connection between X and Y. At best, X is a subset of
Y, but one cannot conclude that if there is no evidence of X (or even
given what Cù wants, "there is evidence of no X"), then there must be
Y. Even if we grant Cù A = B (i.e., what the RVN constitution describes
is the official viewpoint of the RVN), we still cannot derive Y from X
or not X. In other words, one cannot say, "If the official viewpoint of
the RVN does not say that only South Vietnam is the sovereign state or
country, then the official viewpoint of the RVN must be that the entire
Vietnam is the sovereign state or country." It’s because there are many
other conclusions one can draw given that not only South Vietnam is a
state. For example, both North Vietnam and South Vietnam are states, or
the entire Vietnam is not a sovereign state, or only North Vietnam is a
state.
Even if we include Z = "the RVN’s unification plan," there is still a
missing link to show that "not X + Z = Y." In other words, given that
the two RVN constitutions do not show only South Vietnam is designated a
sovereign state and there is a unification plan, one cannot conclude
that the RVN official view is the entire Vietnam is designated a
sovereign state. This is because statehood is independent of territorial
expansion or unification. A state can be a sovereign state and is later
combined or unified with another sovereign state or region to become a
larger sovereign state. In addition, a region of a former sovereign
state may be occupied by a faction such that its territory is reduced to
a smaller part, and this smaller part is therefore a sovereign state.
Cù's argument appears to be based on the fact that South Vietnam being a
state and the entire Vietnam being a state are two mutually exclusive
events. In other words, since South Vietnam is a subset of Vietnam, both
South Vietnam and Vietnam cannot be states together. The mistake of
this view is that the statehoods of South Vietnam and Vietnam do not
have to occur at the same time. In other words, there are two
interpretations that account for the fact that South Vietnam and the
entire Vietnam can be states, but not at the same time:
(1) South Vietnam is a sovereign state or country and the entire Vietnam
will become a sovereign state or country when South Vietnam removes the
communist faction occupying North Vietnam.
(2) The entire Vietnam was a sovereign state or country, but the
territory has been occupied by the communist faction in the North. The
territory of Vietnam is therefore now reduced to South Vietnam which is a
sovereign state or country by virtue of inheritance of statehood from
Vietnam.
As we can see, either one or both of the above interpretations are indeed the proper conclusions based on historical records.
In summary, given that A does not mention X and Z exists, the conclusion
that B is Y is a giant leap of logic. This conclusion does not follow
from A, X and Z. Cù’s argument is therefore a logical fallacy of non
sequitur.
There are other fallacies in Cù’s argument. I can briefly mention a few of them.
One formal fallacy is the improper complement of a subset: because South
Vietnam is a subset of the entire Vietnam, the complement of South
Vietnam being a state is different than the entire Vietnam being a
state.
Another fallacy is false analogy. Cù analogizes "mentioning" with
"asserting." The two RVN constitutions do not mention that only the RVN
is a state or country, but not mentioning is not the same as not
asserting. A person may not mention that he is rich, but this is not the
same as not asserting that he is rich.
Another fallacy is using different standards. Under the first standard,
Cù uses the RVN two constitutions as proof that the RVN does not assert
that only South Vietnam is a sovereign state. However, in the second
standard, he uses the two RVN constitutions plus the unification plan as
proof that the RVN considers that the entire Vietnam is a sovereign
state. If he uses the same first standard, it is clear that the RVN two
constitutions also do not assert that only the entire Vietnam is a
sovereign state, and coupled with the clear evidence that North Vietnam
was occupied by the communist faction, one has to conclude that South
Vietnam was a sovereign state. The unification plan even strengthens
this idea of re-taking the land occupied by the communists.
c. Under an objective standard, South Vietnam was considered a
sovereign state based on its numerous international memberships and
diplomatic ties with other countries.
Cù’s subjective approach in judging the statehood of the RVN is
improper. The statehood of a nation is determined by an objective
standard, i.e., the statehood as seen by others. Otherwise, all nations
can be sovereign states simply by declaring it is so. Bill Gates cannot
deny his wealth simply by declaring, "I am poor." Under this objective
standard, one important condition for being a sovereign state or country
is the ability to have supreme power to deal with other sovereign
states or countries. This includes recognition by other countries and
participation in international affairs.
Although they were not United Nations (U.N.) members, both North Vietnam
and South Vietnam were considered by other sovereign states or
countries as sovereign states (See, for example, Wikipedia 2015c). In
addition, the U.N. considered South Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam,
as a sovereign state when it voted to recommend South Vietnam be
admitted into membership. On February 28, 1957, the U.N. General
Assembly “voted 40 to 8 to recommend to the Security Council that the
Republic of Vietnam and of Korea be admitted into membership” (Olsen
2006, 75). Furthermore, the Soviet Union always viewed South Vietnam and
North Vietnam as two independent states (ibid.) South Vietnam was also a
member of numerous international agencies including World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, Interpol, UNESCO, etc. (Wikipedia 2015d).
South Vietnam had diplomatic relations with numerous countries including
the United States, France, West Germany, Australia, New Zealand, South
Korea, and others.
The large number of South Vietnam’s international memberships and
diplomatic ties with other sovereign states or countries clearly
indicates that South Vietnam was indeed a sovereign state or a country.
In summary, Cù’s argument regarding South Vietnam’s statehood is
completely invalid for its self contradiction and logical fallacy.
According to the universally accepted objective standards, The Republic
of Vietnam was a sovereign state or a country prior to April 30, 1975.
3. There was indeed a loss of country on both emotional attachment
and physical existence bases when South Vietnam fell into communist
hands
After attempting to show that South Vietnam was not a sovereign state or
a country and there was no invasion by the Vietnamese communist faction
into South Vietnam, Cù concludes that there was no loss of country
because there was no country to be lost. Remarkably, while he makes a
significant effort to show the RVN’s unification plan, Cù simply draws a
conclusion that there was no loss of country as if this was an obvious
conclusion. This indicates Cù’s ignorance about the concept of loss,
even in a normal sense.
By definition, loss is a result of failure to keep or to continue having
something or the experience of having something taken from you or
destroyed. To most South Vietnamese, the country of South Vietnam was
lost when the Northern communist faction invaded and occupied South
Vietnam on April 30, 1975. Even if South Vietnam was not a state and
only the entire Vietnam was a state, as Cù asserts, the South
Vietnamese can still have a feeling of loss when the entire state of
Vietnam falls into communist hands.
The feeling of loss is based on: emotional attachment and physical existence.
a. Loss of country implies a damage to emotional attachment to the
country now under an unworthy regime, and does not necessarily involve
absence or disappearance of a physical existence
Loss is usually associated with possession, acquisition, sense of
belonging, or love. You lose your money, car, motorcycle, house, job,
temper, a loved one, etc. The thing or the person you lose may or may
not cease to exist. If your house is destroyed completely by a fire, you
lose your house and it no longer exists. However, suppose you can no
longer afford to pay the mortgage, the bank seizes your home and sells
it to somebody else. You lose your house but it still exists; it just
belongs to a new owner.
When we talk about losing something or someone, we may refer to that
thing or that person as a physical entity, but the loss may imply a
damage of a spiritual or emotional attachment. The emotional attachment
may still exist but the object for the emotional attachment may no
longer be within one’s reach, control, sense of belonging, or
possession. One therefore has a feeling of loss and cherishes the
memories associated with that thing or that person. When you lose your
house because you can no longer afford to pay the mortgage, you still
love your house and can still see it when you pass by, but you cannot
live there. You have a feeling of loss and cherish the memories of
living there. The feeling of loss is even more intensified if the
current owner ruins what you considered sacred or valuable. You feel
pain when the new owner sells the back yard to the neighbor, neglects
watering the once beautiful flowers and the trees, or does not maintain
the lawn on the front yard.
Similarly, losing one’s country does not imply that the country is
destroyed, ceases to exist, or is erased from the world map. When the
South Vietnamese, overseas or domestic, say they lose their country,
what they mean is the country of South Vietnam is no longer within their
reach, control, or sense of belonging because it is occupied,
controlled, and governed by people who are unworthy and do not share the
same ideals and values they do. Their love for their country still
exists, but they have a sense of loss because the group of people in
power mistreats and abuses the people and the territory, and destroys
the values that are dear to them, such as human rights, freedom, and
democracy.
The above concept of losing one’s country is basic. Almost everybody
knows that. Peculiarly, Cù does not seem to know it, or he may know but
ignores it. Instead, in arguing that the country is not lost, he
writes, "Indeed, as of now Vietnam still has its name on the world map,
is a member of the United Nations, and has diplomatic ties with many
countries including the United States, despite the fact that its
territory has been occupied by China in many places, especially in the
East Sea." ("Thực vậy, cho đến nay Việt Nam vẫn có tên trên bản đồ thế
giới, là thành viên Liên Hiệp Quốc, có quan hệ ngoại giao với nhiều nước
trong đó có Hoa Kỳ, cho dù lãnh thổ đã bị Trung Quốc chiếm nhiều nơi,
nhất là ở biển Đông.")
Strangely, Cù relies on factors such as a name on the world map and
diplomatic ties with other countries as evidence of existence of a state
or country, but denies South Vietnam’s status as a state or country
even though prior to April 30, 1975 South Vietnam clearly had its name
on the world map and had diplomatic ties with numerous countries
including the United States as discussed above. The only factor that
South Vietnam (and also North Vietnam) didn’t have is membership in the
U.N. But if this is what Cù has in mind, i.e., membership in the U.N.
as the only, or the most important, condition for being a state or
country, then according to Cù, Switzerland was not a state or country
until 2002 when it became a U.N. member. This is clearly an improper
conclusion. More importantly, as discussed above, Cù contradicts
himself when he asserts that North Korea and South Korea were two
separate states or countries during the war from 1950 to 1953, even
though North Korea and South Korea were not members of the U.N. until
1991.
b. Loss of country also implies absence of physical existence when
the country of South Vietnam was occupied by the Northern communist
faction.
While most South Vietnamese refer to the loss of their country with a
spiritual and emotional meaning, some may refer to it as an absence of
physical existence. But this physical existence is not related to the
land, the mountains, the rivers, the seas, the islands, etc. Rather, it
is related to the concrete concepts of sovereignty, properties, rights,
and other values that have concrete expressions (e.g., the flag of the
RVN, the national anthem). The word "nước" in "mất nước" (loss of
country) implies the sovereign state of South Vietnam, or the RVN. As
discussed above, the RVN was a sovereign state or country, not just to
other foreigners, but even more so to the former citizens of South
Vietnam.
Physical existence includes the concrete authority or power to control
the people and the territory, the possession of properties, and more.
The Vietnamese communists attacked and occupied South Vietnam by force,
took away the authority and power, imposed ownership on properties,
private and public. To many South Vietnamese, losing their homes, their
lands, their properties, their freedom, their ability to elect their
representatives in the governing of the country, and other values is the
same as losing their country.
In summary, there was indeed a loss of country to the South Vietnamese, whether this sense of loss was spiritual or physical.
4. April 30 is and will always be the National Day of Hatred even after the communist regime collapses in the future
Let’s first have some definition and translation issues ironed out. The
meaning of the term "quốc hận" is important because it reflects the
sentiment of the South Vietnamese people, domestic or overseas, about
the loss of the sovereign state of the RVN. In addition, it also
properly reflects the commemoration of the end of the sovereign state of
the RVN and the beginning of the darkest period in the history of
Vietnam. I want to emphasize that the sovereign state of the RVN
collapsed on April 30, 1975, but the RVN is still alive and prospers as a
country, though occupied, and a nation, and will become a sovereign
state again having the entire Vietnam as its territory when the
communist regime collapses in a very near future.
a. The term "ngày quốc hận" should be translated into "national day
of hatred" because it accurately describes the deep resentment toward
the Vietnamese communists for what they have done to Vietnam.
The English term "National Day of Hatred" is a literal translation of
the Vietnamese term "Ngày Quốc Hận." It should be noted that “National
Day of Hatred” is more correct in Engish than "National Hatred Day."
Other translated terms include "National Shame Day" (or "National Day of
Shame") (Nguyen and Haines 1996, 320), "National Anger Day" (or
"National Day of Anger"), "National Day of Anger" (Trần Văn Tích), "Day
of National Resentment," and "Day of Commemoration" (DiMaggio and
Fernandez-Kelly 2010, 213).
In Vietnamese, the word "quốc" means country or nation. (I will discuss
in more details the definitions of these terms in a next article.) Used
as an adjective, "quốc" means "national." The word "hận" is a little
more complex. When used alone, its literal meaning includes "hatred,"
"resentment," "acrimony," "hostility," or "animosity." The word "hận"
may also be used as a secondary word for the term "ân hận" which means
"regret," "repentance," or "remorse." However, the term "ân hận" is
seldom used in short form as a single word "hận." Therefore, this
meaning can be readily disregarded.
The word "hận" may also be used together with the word "thù" to make a
compound word "thù hận" or "hận thù." Although they can be used in a
compound word, "hận" and "thù" can be used individually with similar
meanings. "Hận" and "thù" both imply a deep feeling of hatred,
resentment, or animosity, but they connote a slightly subtle difference.
This subtle difference is difficult to explain, even for the
Vietnamese. A few examples can illustrate this. "Thù," when used with a
word that indicates a person ("kẻ"), a group of people like soldiers
("quân"), a faction ("phe"), means the "enemy." For example, "kẻ thù,"
"quân thù," "phe thù." In this context, "thù" is usually used
together with the word "nghịch" or "địch" which means "adversary" or
"opponent." Therefore, "thù" implies an explicit, concrete, clear-cut
deep hatred, resentment, or animosity for an act that is readily
recognized as causing anger, sadness, or sorrow to a person. On the
other hand, "hận" is never used together with "kẻ," "quân," or "phe"
to indicate the enemy."hận" implies something more implicit and more
abstract, but still deep resentment. A woman may "hận" her lover for
leaving her for a younger or more beautiful woman. John may "hận" Steve
because Steve not only took all John's wealth but also the love of
John's children. Linda may "hận" David because not only did David kill
Linda's parents, but he also dug up Linda's ancestors' tombs. Therefore,
"hận" implies a deep, sharp, and narrow hatred, resentment, acrimony,
or animosity for an act that not only causes anger, sorrow, and
bitterness to a person but also touches deep into that person's sacred
and personal love or treasure.
In the context of what the Vietnamese communists have done to the South
Vietnamese people in particular, and to the Vietnamese people as a
whole, and in a broader sense, to the Fatherland of Vietnam, the word
"hận" is the most suitable word.
It should be noted that another word that can be used together with
"thù" is "ghét." These two words can be used together to form a
compound word "thù ghét" (but never "ghét thù"). The verb "ghét"
means "hate" or "dislike." Its intensity is much less than "hận" or
"thù" and therefore should not be used in the context of deep hatred,
resentment, or animosity.
For the above meanings, "hận" should not be translated into English as
"anger" or "shame" although "anger" or "shame" may indicate other
aspects of "hận." The best single English word for "hận" would be
"hatred" because of its brevity and ease in understanding.
b. By equating the meaning of "national hatred" with that of "loss of
country," Cù trivializes the intense resentment and hatred of the
Vietnamese people toward the communist regime.
Cù elaborates his arguments on the issue that South Vietnam was not a
sovereign state or a country by its own constitutions and its plans for
unification. This appears to be the center of his arguments because he
reaches the conclusions that there was no loss of country and there was
no National Day of Hatred on this basis alone. He writes, "Similarly, we
cannot call April 30 the 'National Day of Hatred' because there was no
'loss of country' on that day." ("Cũng như vậy, không thể gọi ngày 30
tháng 4 là 'Ngày Quốc hận' vì đã không có chuyện 'mất nước' vào ngày
đó.") Remarkably, Cù oversimplifies the issue by equating the meaning
of "national hatred" with "loss of country."
By saying that there was no loss of country, so there should be no
national hatred, Cù implies that the loss of country is the only cause
of the national hatred by the South Vietnamese. And yet, immediately
after this assertion, Cù writes, "However, it is undeniable that the
hatred of the Vietnamese, who once served the regime of the Republic of
Vietnam, and their families toward the Vietnamese communist government
is tremendous. So, what are the causes?" ("Mặc dầu vậy, không thể phủ
nhận oán hận của những người Việt từng phục vụ chính thể Việt Nam Cộng
hòa và gia đình họ đối với chính quyền cộng sản Việt Nam là vô cùng lớn.
Vậy đâu là nguyên nhân?"). In other words, Cù admits that there is
indeed intense hatred of the South Vietnamese toward the current
communist regime, but he does not consider this hatred to be related to
April 30, 1975. As analyzed at the beginning of this article, this
statement is the beginning of the second part of Cù’s essay. Cù
clearly separates the two parts by separating the "national hatred" in
the "national day of hatred" from the "South Vietnamese hatred toward
the current communist regime."
One can refute Cù’s conclusion that there is no national day of hatred
simply by showing that South Vietnam was indeed a state or country and
there was indeed a loss of country when South Vietnam was occupied by
the Vietnamese communists, as what I did above. However, there is more
than just refuting Cù’s argument. It is more instructive to refute
Cù’s conclusion on the basis of its lack of validity.
Cù agrees that it is valid for the South Vietnamese people to hate the
communist regime, but he denies that this hatred is related to April 30.
Cù appears to say that there is no connection between the two because
the national day of hatred commemorates a particular day, which marks
the collapse of the RVN regime, while the current South Vietnamese
hatred toward the current communist regime is the result of accumulated
years of resentment toward the treatment of the communist government
that took place several years after April 30, 1975. This view is wrong.
These two facts are actually tightly related through April 30. If the
sovereign state of the RVN did not collapse, the Vietnamese communists
would not reveal their true faces of criminals, traitors of the
Fatherland, brutal oppressors of the people, and frauds.
As discussed in my previous article regarding the significance of the
RVN yellow flag (Cao-Đắc 2014), communist propaganda has always said
that the anti-communist South Vietnamese people, especially the former
RVN soldiers, hate the Vietnamese communists because they (the South
Vietnamese) lost in the war. By characterizing the former RVN soldiers
as sore losers, the Vietnamese communists attempt to trivialize the
intense feelings of resentment and hatred toward the communist regime.
Losing a war has never been the cause of hatred of the Vietnamese people
toward the winning side in the history of Vietnam and even more so with
the South Vietnamese after April 1975. The history of Vietnam has shown
that despite many civil wars over hundreds of years, from the war among
the twelve independent feudal warlords in the 10th century to the war
between the Trịnh and Nguyễn in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the
Tây Sơn and the Nguyễn in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the
Vietnamese people have always managed to live peacefully together.
Furthermore, the population of the former RVN soldiers was reltively
small at the beginning and has dwindled significantly after 40 years.
Those who are alive are now well into their 60s, 70s or 80s. Most of
them want to live a peaceful life. Many of the anti-communist Vietnamese
are descendants of the first generation South Vietnamese and have no
memory or experience of the Vietnam War.
The anti-communist South Vietnamese hate the communist regime not
because South Vietnam lost the war, but because the communists treat the
Vietnamese, whether North or South, with cruelty, brutality, and
oppression. More importantly, the communist regime robs the people,
nurtures corruption, ruins the morality in society, destroys the
culture, damages the land, betrays the fatherland, conspires to sell the
country to communist China, destroys the mind of the young people,
defrauds the people with lies and cover-ups, and commits numerous crimes
against the people.
The National Day of Hatred was not so named immediately after April 30,
1975. It took several years before the OV communities around the world
became stable in their new homes. The commemoration of April 30 as the
National Day of Hatred has become more and more elaborate and meaningful
as more and more evidence of the crimes of the VCP become known and
exposed. On that day, there are parades showing the OV pride and
activities, meetings denouncing the VCP’s crimes with speeches and
pictures, rememberance and praying ceremonies for the victims of the
communists and those who sacrificed their lives for freedom and
democracy, and other cultural programs.
By saying that since there was no loss of country, there should not be a
national day of hatred day, Cù appears to think that the OV
communities commemorate April 30 as the National Day of Hatred because
it marks the end of the RVN. While it is true that April 30 is the day
when the sovereign state of the RVN collapsed, April 30 is called the
National Day of Hatred not just because of this event. It is so called
mainly because it marks the beginning of the darkest period in the
history of Vietnam. Moreover, although the sovereign state of RVN
collapsed on April 30, 1975, the country and nation of the RVN have
never been destroyed. On the contrary, as will be discussed in my next
article, the RVN is still alive and prospers as a country, though
occupied, and a nation.
If after the collapse of the sovereign state of the RVN, the VCP brought
the country of Vietnam to prosperity, treated the people with respect
and dignity, honored human and civil rights, respected freedom and true
democracy, reduced corruption, and acted with courage toward communist
China, then April 30 would never be called the National Day of Hatred.
In fact, under that scenario, most likely many OV would enthusiastically
return to Vietnam to participate in rebuilding the country.
The concept of the national hatred day as a day to commemorate the
beginning of a period of shame, anger, or darkness is well understood by
all countries in the world. The term "National Day of Hatred" has also
been used to commemorate "the excesses of the Khmer Rouge regime that
ruled the country between 1975 and 1979" (Wikipedia 2015e). The term
"national hatred" has also been used to describe a certain historical
event such as the animosity of China toward Japan during the
Sino-Japanese war, especially the event in 1937 known as the Great
Nanjing Massacre (Chen 2010, 583; Yim 2013).
After 40 years, the VCP has destroyed the country and the people of
Vietnam. April 30 is indeed the day that marks the gloomiest period in
the history of Vietnam. Accordingly, April 30 is properly called the
National Day of Hatred, even if later the country rids itself of the VCP
and becomes prosperous.
C. Conclusion
This article refutes the first part of the essay written by Cù Huy Hà
Vũ. This part is full of errors in all aspects, from premises,
arguments, and conclusions. The premise that an invasion only involves a
state or country is incorrect. In addition, his argument that South
Vietnam was not a sovereign state or country is self-contradictory, is a
logical fallacy, and is wrong under an objective standard. More
importantly, Cù’s conclusion that there was no loss of country and
April 30 should not be the National Day of Hatred indicates his
ignorance of the feeling of loss and hatred toward the current communist
regime by the OV and the Vietnamese people living in Vietnam.
Cù could have written a much more powerful and convincing article if he
changed the first part and linked it logically to the second part. He
could have argued that the invasion of the Vietnamese communists into
South Vietnam indeed took away the RVN spirit of freedom and democracy
and caused a tremendous sense of loss of country to the South Vietnamese
people. Therefore, April 30 must be the National Day of Hatred because
not only does it properly mark the collapse of the sovereign state of
RVN, but it also marks the beginning of the darkest period of the
history of Vietnam as evidenced by the communists’ brutality imposed on
the South Vietnamese people right after the war and the oppression of
the entire Vietnamese people ever since. Accordingly, dissolution of the
VCP is the most effective solution to bring prosperity to Vietnam and
to further strengthen the love among the Vietnamese people, from South
to North, despite the government efforts to divide the people and to
distort history.
09/06/2015
______________________________________
References:
Bennett, Bo. Unknown date. Logically Fallcious. Unknown date.
Cù Huy Hà Vũ. 2015. Tự do sẽ chấm dứt hận thù dân tộc. May 14, 2015.
DiMaggio, Paul and Fernandez-Kelly, Patricia. 2010. Art in the Lives of Immigrant Communities in the United State. Rutgers University Press, Piscataway, NJ. U.S.A.
Nguyen, Hung Manh and Haines, David W. 1996. Vietnamese. Chapter 14 in “Refugees in America in the 1990s: A Reference Handbook,” by David W. Haines (Ed.). Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, U.S.A.
Olsen, Mari. 2006. Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of China, 1949-64: Changing Alliances. Routledge, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Sorley, Lewis. 1999. A Better War. Hartcourt, Inc. Orlando, Florida. U.S.A.
_________. 2015c. List of former sovereign states. May 28, 2015.
_________. 2015e. Day of Remembrance (Cambodia). May 20, 2015.
_________. 2015f. Easter Offensive. June 8, 2015.
© 2015 Tuấn Cao-Đắc
